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Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect†
By Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar*
Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized 
the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet 
taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should 
also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the 
context of a statutory wage increase in India’s employment guaran-
tee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household 
survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose 
effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft 
by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73, 
D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)
Disciplining corrupt officials is a key governance challenge in developing coun-tries.1 In an influential early analysis, Becker and Stigler (1974) argued that if 
there is some chance of detecting and dismissing corrupt agents then the principal 
can mitigate the problem by paying an efficiency wage. Intuitively, agents have an 
incentive to cheat less today in order to improve their chances of earning a wage 
premium (or pension) tomorrow. Subsequent work has maintained this emphasis on 
contracts designed to offer future rents.2
In contrast, the literature has put less emphasis on the role played by expectations 
of illicit future rents. This paper focuses explicitly on the dynamic trade-off between 
extracting rents today and improving one’s chances of surviving to extract rents 
tomorrow. We call this latter motive the “golden goose” effect to reflect the idea that 
1 Recent work has shown how corruption constrains redistribution (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2006), 
creates new market distortions (Sequeira and Djankov 2010), and hinders efforts to remedy existing ones (Bertrand 
et al. 2007).
2 See Cadot (1987), Andvig and Moene (1990), Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), and 
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), among others. Becker and Stigler’s (1974) model is a multi-period one but they 
examined a contract that entirely eliminates illicit rents. As we discuss below, the literature on electoral discipline 
is an important exception.
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agents want to preserve “the goose that lays the golden eggs” (unlike the deplorably 
myopic farmer in the fable).3 We show that incorporating the golden goose effect 
into standard models tends to weaken or even overturn the usual comparative statics 
because of a generic tendency for static and dynamic effects to offset each other.4
To assess the relevance of this mechanism we gathered data from India’s larg-
est rural welfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS). The scheme entitles every rural household in India to up to 100 days 
of paid, on-demand employment per year; it is also of intrinsic interest given that 
it covers roughly 11 percent of the world’s population. We obtained disaggregated 
official records on participation, including the names and addresses of participating 
households, the duration of each spell of employment, and the amount of compensa-
tion paid. We then independently surveyed a sample of these (alleged) beneficiaries 
to document the amounts of work actually done and payments actually received. 
The gap between official and actual payments—which includes both overreporting 
of days and underpayment of wages—is the primary form of corruption we study.5
Testing for golden goose effects requires an exogenous source of variation in 
anticipated rent-extraction opportunities. We exploit a policy change: a  May 1, 
2007 increase in the statutory wage due to program participants in the state of 
Orissa. A higher statutory wage means more lucrative corruption opportunities for 
officials, since they receive more money for every fictitious day of work reported. 
Importantly, the wage reform was enacted by policymakers well removed from the 
officials we study, making it plausibly exogenous. Because the wage increase was 
specific to the state of Orissa we can also use data from the neighboring state of 
Andhra Pradesh as a control in some specifications.
Interestingly, the effects of a wage change on daily-wage overreporting turn 
out to be theoretically ambiguous. There is an obvious static price effect: officials 
receive more money for every day of wage work they report, strengthening their 
incentives to overreport. If the wage increase were temporary this would be the 
only effect. Following a permanent change, however, there is also a dynamic golden 
goose effect: officials anticipate a more lucrative future, weakening their incentives 
to overreport.
To separate out golden goose effects we exploit the fact that compensation on 
roughly 30 percent of the NREGS projects in our sample was based on piece rates 
rather than a daily wage. This heterogeneity reflects the fact that piece rates could 
not be implemented on some projects where output was hard to measure. Because 
the schedule of projects had been fixed in advance of the May 1, 2007 wage change, 
and because piece-rate schedules were not revised along with the daily wage, the 
wage change should not have directly affected piece-rate projects. Officials who 
were managing piece-rate projects at the time of the wage change often had wage 
projects planned in the near future, however, and thus experienced a shift in their 
future rent expectations. This effect should also have been stronger in proportion to 
3 Our usage differs from McMillan (2001), who uses “golden goose” to describe ex ante investments by indi-
viduals that a government may hold up ex post. Commitment will not be an issue in our setting.
4 Note that the framework here is one of observed types, as opposed to the career concerns framework in which 
the agent wishes to influence future perceptions of his ability (or honesty) (Holmström 1999).
5 On the importance of measuring corruption directly, rather than using perceptions, see Olken (2009).
232 AmErIcAN EcoNomIc JourNAL: EcoNomIc PoLIcY NoVEmBEr 2013
the share of upcoming projects that were daily wage. Theory thus predicts that the 
wage increase should (i) reduce theft from piece-rate projects, and (ii) differentially 
reduce corruption in villages with more daily-wage projects upcoming.
We take these predictions to panel data on corruption before and after the policy 
shock in 215 panchayats (villages). The data suggest that prices do matter: when 
statutory daily wages increase, officials report more fictitious work on wage proj-
ects. Overall, the daily-wage increase from Rs 55 to Rs 70 (combined with secular 
trends) increased the cost to the government per dollar received by beneficiaries 
from $4.08 to $5.03. We also find evidence consistent with golden goose effects. 
First, theft on piece-rate projects in Orissa declined after the shock, both in absolute 
terms and relative to neighboring Andhra Pradesh. Second, both daily-wage over-
reporting and piece-rate theft fell differentially (the former significantly) in villages 
that subsequently executed a higher share of daily-wage projects. While some of 
the point estimates are imprecise, so that magnitudes should be interpreted cau-
tiously, they suggest large golden goose effects. Rough calculations imply that theft 
increased by 64 percent less than it would have had the wage increase been tempo-
rary. This point estimate need not be externally valid for other settings, of course; we 
merely emphasize that dynamics appear to play a large role even in a setting where 
tenure is typically quite short.
To separate our interpretation from other substitution mechanisms we test for 
time-symmetry. Intuitively, most substitution mechanisms imply that the effects of 
future rent expectations should be similar to the effects of past and current rent real-
izations. For example, if the marginal value of rents is decreasing so that officials 
become “satiated” then both past and future windfalls should decrease current rent 
extraction. Empirically we find a consistent negative relationship with future rent-
extraction opportunities, but an inconsistent relationship with past rent-extraction 
opportunities. We also analyze data on visits by superior officials to rule out con-
founding changes in monitoring intensity.
Our analysis has four main implications for anticorruption policy. First, it pro-
vides evidence in support of the broad hypothesis that future rents matter, which is 
at the heart of the efficiency wage concept. As Olken and Pande (2012) discuss, gov-
ernment wages have received a great deal of attention, yet the empirical evidence 
has been limited to cross-country regressions and to the indirect test in Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2003) who study the differential effects of an audit crackdown. We 
simply exploit variation in expectations of illicit as opposed to licit rents to test the 
same underlying mechanism.6
Second, our data suggest that optimal contracts should take illicit as well as licit 
rents into account. Comparing what we know about the compensation of officials 
we study to our estimates of corruption implies that their illicit earnings are orders 
of magnitude greater than their licit wage (150 to 1,100 times wages), let alone 
their wage premium. Calculations that leave out these illicit rents are unlikely to 
hit the mark.
6 As some NREGS officials are elected the results can also be read as supporting theories of electoral disci-
pline in which voters must allow politicians some future rents in order to maintain control over them (Barro 1973; 
Ferejohn 1986; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; Ahlin 2005; Ferraz and Finan 2011).
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Third, our data suggest that concerns about the “displacement” effects of anti-
corruption work should be taken seriously. As Yang (2008) discusses, the possibil-
ity that cracking down on one kind of corruption may lead to increases in other 
kinds has been widely discussed but rarely tested. Our data support this hypothesis. 
Indeed, the golden goose mechanism generates displacement generically: any use 
of the “stick” that reduces future rent expectations also makes the “carrot” of job 
security less motivating. The analysis thus complements Yang’s model based on 
nonconvexities in lawbreaking.
Finally, our results suggest that policy pilots should be interpreted carefully in 
weakly institutionalized settings. Simply put, a pilot generates different dynamic 
incentives than permanent implementation. For example, distributing welfare ben-
efits once does not generate future rent expectations, while distributing them repeat-
edly does; a pilot may therefore appear to perform artificially poorly. Auditing once 
does not reduce future rent expectations, while a regular program of audits does; a 
pilot may therefore appear to perform artificially well. Generally speaking, expecta-
tions matter for interpreting results on monitoring (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; 
Nagin et al. 2002; Olken 2007) and on transparency more generally (Reinikka and 
Svensson 2005; Ferraz and Finan 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section I describes the NREGS con-
text, Section II lays out the theoretical framework, Section III describes data collec-
tion and estimation equations, Section IV presents results, and Section V concludes.
I. Contextual Background on the NREGS
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (now called the “Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”) is a landmark effort to redis-
tribute income to the rural poor. The program was launched in February 2006 in 
the poorest 200 districts in India and as of April 2008 covers the entire country 
(604 rural districts). The total proposed budget allocation for the April 2010–March 
2011 fiscal year is Rs 401 billion (US$ 8.9 billion), which is 0.73 percent of 2008 
GDP.7 It is likely that the steady-state cost will be higher as implementation is still 
incomplete in many parts of the country. The following discussion describes the 
program as it was implemented during our study period; some of the procedures 
described may have changed.
A. Statutory operational Procedures
Each operational program cycle begins before the start of a fiscal year, when local 
governments at the Gram Panchayat (GP or panchayat, lowest level of administra-
tion in the Indian government, comprising of a group of villages) and block (inter-
mediate level of government between GPs and districts) levels plan a “shelf ” of 
projects to be undertaken during the upcoming year. The particular types of project 
7 Costs: http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/bh/bhi.pdf. GDP: http://mospi.nic.in/4_gdpind_cur.pdf. The cen-
tral government must by law contribute at most 90 percent of total expenditure, the rest of the funding coming from 
the states.
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allowed under the NREGS are typical of rural employment projects: road construc-
tion and earthworks related to irrigation and water conservation predominate.
Projects also vary in the payment scheme they utilize: NREGS workers can be 
paid either on a daily-wage or a piece-rate basis depending on the practicality of 
measuring output. There are broad categories of projects that are paid on piece rate as 
opposed to daily wage; for example all irrigation/water conservation projects which 
involve digging ditches are piece rate, while all road construction/paving projects are 
daily wage. Empirically it is the case that all the work done on any particular project 
is generally compensated in the same manner (see Figure 1). Consequently, there are 
identifiable daily-wage projects and piece-rate projects. While according to statute 
the project shelf should be proposed by village assemblies (Gram Sabhas), in prac-
tice higher up officials at the block and district level suggest and approve the shelf.
A key feature of the NREGS is that it is an unrestricted entitlement program: 
every household in rural India has a right to 100 days of paid employment per year, 
with no eligibility requirements.8 To obtain work on a project, interested households 
must first apply for a jobcard.9 The jobcard contains a list of household members, 
some basic demographic information, and blank spaces for recording work and pay-
ment history. In principle, any household can obtain a jobcard for free at either the 
panchayat or block administrative office. Jobcards in hand, workers can apply for 
work at any time. The applicant must be assigned to a project within 15 days after 
submitting the application; if not they are eligible for unemployment compensation. 
Applicants have no influence over the choice of project.
8 Officials thus do not have an opportunity cost of allocating work to workers, as in Banerjee (1997).
9 Since each household is limited to 100 days of employment per year, the definition of a household is impor-
tant. In NREGS guidelines a household is “a nuclear family comprising mother, father, and their children, and may 
include any person wholly or substantially dependent on the head of the family” (Ministry of Rural Development 
2006).
Figure 1. Distribution of Project Types
Notes: Plots distribution of projects in study panchayats by the fraction of spells of (reported) 
work done that were daily wage spells. Work spells are coded as daily wage spells if the pay-
ment per day is one of the statutory daily wages. (Orissa implements four different daily wages 
for varying skill levels).
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At the work sites the panchayat officials record attendance (in the case of daily-
wage projects) or measure output (in the piece-rate case). They record this informa-
tion both in workers’ jobcards and in muster rolls which are sent to block offices 
and digitized. The state and central governments reimburse local governments on 
the basis of these electronic records. Most workers in our study area received their 
wages in cash from the panchayat administration, although efforts to pay them 
through banks are under way. As a transparency measure, all the official microdata 
on payments have been made publicly available through a web portal maintained by 
the central Ministry of Rural Development (http://nrega.nic.in).
B. Implementing officials
The officials in charge of implementing the program are mainly appointed 
bureaucrats at the block (Block Development Officers, Junior Engineers, Assistant 
Engineers) and panchayat (Panchayat Secretary, Field Assistants, Mates, etc.) levels, 
with the exception of the elected chairman of the Gram Panchayat (the “Sarpanch”). 
district level program officials, including the District Collector, oversee block offi-
cials’ work. While in principal officials can be fired, suspended, or removed from 
their jobs for misconduct, Article 311(2) of the Indian constitution says that no civil 
servant can be dismissed without an official inquiry, which makes it difficult to fire 
someone outright in practice. Suspensions and transfers into backwater jobs, how-
ever, are common punishments (Das 2001).
Because our analysis revolves around forward-looking optimization, it is useful 
to understand bureaucratic tenure in these jobs. Tenure for elected Sarpanchs is five 
years. Tenure for appointed bureaucrats is typically shorter, primarily because trans-
fers are used as a disciplinary tool and as a way for political parties to bestow favors. 
Iyer and Mani (2009) document that the district-level Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) officers who oversee local officials stay in a job for a year and a half on average, 
and since they often move with their staff this implies that the tenure of lower-level 
officials is at least as short. In Gujarat, Block Development Officers keep that post for 
an average of sixteen months (de Zwart 1994, 94). Given the small but significant pay 
differential between private sector and public sector jobs at this level (Das 2001) and 
the short tenure, local public officials often seek opportunities for extracting rents.
C. rent Extraction, monitoring, and Enforcement
Officials’ opportunities for illicit gain include control over project selection; 
bribes for obtaining jobcards and/or employment; and embezzlement from the 
materials and labor budgets. We focus on theft from the labor budget, which we can 
cleanly measure. The labor budget is required by law to exceed 60 percent of total 
spending, and in fact we find that theft in this category is so extensive that even if all 
of the 40 percent allocated to materials were stolen, the labor budget would still be 
the larger source of illegal rents.10
10 We also found that bribes paid to obtain jobcards are uncommon (17 percent report paying positive amounts) 
and small (averaging Rs 10 conditional on being positive).
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Theft from the labor budget comes in two conceptually distinct forms. First, offi-
cials can underpay workers for the work they have done (theft from beneficiaries). 
Second, officials can overreport the amount of work done when they send their 
reports up the hierarchy (theft from taxpayers). For example, a worker who worked 
for ten days on a daily-wage project when the statutory minimum wage was Rs 55 
per day might receive only Rs 45 per day in take-home pay. The official might report 
that the worker had worked for 20 days rather than ten. His total rents would then 
equal 55 ⋅ 20 − 45 ⋅ 10 = 650 rupees, the sum of the two sorts of theft.
A key difference between theft from beneficiaries and theft from taxpayers lies 
in the way they are monitored. Underpaid workers who know they are underpaid 
could either complain to someone at the block or district headquarters or simply 
leave for the private sector. On the other hand, workers have less incentive to moni-
tor overreporting: because the program’s budget is not fixed, a rupee stolen through 
overreporting does not mean a rupee less for the workers. In principal the NREGS 
Operational Guidelines address this issue by calling both for bottom-up monitoring 
via Gram Sabhas (village meetings), local Vigilance and Monitoring Committees, 
and biannual “social audits,” and also top-down monitoring via inspection of works 
by superior officials (100 percent of works checked by block officials, 10 percent 
by district officials, and 2 percent by state officials). The guidelines do not provide 
incentives for auditing or link audit results to budget allocations, however. In prac-
tice there was no systematic audit process in Orissa during the period we study (in 
contrast with, for example, the setting in Olken 2007). What top-down monitoring 
did exist consisted primarily of informal tracking and worksite visits by officials. 
For example, some block and district officials we interviewed use the NREGS’s 
management information system to track aggregate quantities of work done on vari-
ous projects and compare these to technical estimates or their own best guesses of 
the resources required.
Officials caught cheating face a positive but small probability of getting punished. 
Program guidelines call for “speedy action against [corrupt] officials” but do not lay 
out specific penalties. In practice the most likely penalty is suspension or transferal 
to a less desirable job; for elected officials it is loss of office. The Chief Minister at 
one point claimed to have initiated action against nearly half the Block Development 
Officers in the state, but some of this is likely political posturing.11 A more reliable 
source may be the records of OREGS-Watch, a loose online coalition of nongov-
ernmental organizations that monitor NREGS in Orissa; their reports note numer-
ous instances of officials being caught and suspended (http://groups.google.co.in/
group/oregs-watch). The common pattern in these cases was incontrovertible proof 
brought to the office of the District Collector, followed immediately by the suspen-
sion of the guilty official and in some cases by the recovery of the stolen funds. In 
one case in Boudh district, for example, the offending official was caught within 
two weeks of the misdemeanor, the money recovered and the official suspended.12
11 http://www.orissadiary.com/Shownews.asp?id=6201.
12 http://www.dailypioneer.com/59458/Action-taken-after-study-finds-fake-muster-roll-in-Boudh.html.
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D. Wage Setting
Our estimation strategy exploits an increase in statutory program wages in the 
eastern state of Orissa in 2007. Such wage hikes were common due to the incentives 
generated by the NREGS’s funding pattern. The central (federal) government pays 
100 percent of the unskilled labor budget, and 75 percent of the materials budget 
(defined to include the cost of skilled labor) (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2005). 
The states, however, set wages and piece rates. This provision creates strong incen-
tives for state politicians to raise wage rates, benefiting their constituents at the 
central government’s expense.
We study the effects of a change in the statutory daily wage for unskilled work-
ers in Orissa from Rs 55 to Rs 70. This change was announced on April 28, 2007 
and went into effect on May 1, 2007. Importantly, this policy change did not 
directly affect payments on piece-rate projects, and it was specific to Orissa (did 
not affect neighboring Andhra Pradesh).13 Note that wages for three categories of 
higher-skilled labor were also raised on May 1 from Rs 65/75/85 to Rs 80/90/100. 
Because skilled wages are rarely reported in our data (6.5 percent of work spells) 
and their use varies primarily within-project (65 percent of the variation), we focus 
our theoretical discussion around a single-wage rate.
II. Dynamic Rent Extraction
Following Becker and Stigler (1974), a large theoretical literature has studied the 
use of dismissal threats to motivate corruptible agents. Dismissal typically matters 
in these models because agents who are not dismissed expect to receive compensa-
tion greater than their outside option—a wage premium or a pension, for example. 
In a dynamic setting, however, an agent’s expected future rents include both an 
exogenous licit component provided by the contract and also an endogenous illicit 
component determined by their own future corrupt behavior. For example, an offi-
cial thinking about whether to take a bribe today will rationally take into account the 
bribe revenue he expects to earn tomorrow. In this section, we develop a dynamic 
model to examine the role that such expectations play in decision making. We spe-
cialize the framework to our context by modeling the kinds of corruption that we see 
in our data but also comment on broader implications.
Time is discrete. An infinitely lived official and a group of N infinitely lived work-
ers seek to maximize their discounted earnings stream:
(1)   u i (t) =  ∑ τ =t
∞
  β τ−t  y i (τ),
13 The NREGS implementation guidelines state that the states should “devise productivity norms for all the 
tasks listed under piece-rate works for the different local conditions of soil, slope, and geology types in such a way 
that normal work for the prescribed duration of work results in earnings at least equal to the wage rate.” In practice, 
however, this occurs haphazardly and with long and variable lags. In Orissa wages were revised on May 1, 2007, 
but the piece-rate schedule was not amended until August 16, 2007, a month and a half after our study period ends, 
and at that time some rates were lowered rather than raised.
238 AmErIcAN EcoNomIc JourNAL: EcoNomIc PoLIcY NoVEmBEr 2013
where  y i (τ) are the earnings of agent i in period τ. Additional players with identical 
preferences wait in the wings to replace the official should he be fired.
In each period exactly one NREGS project is active. We abstract from simultane-
ous ongoing projects primarily to simplify the exposition; it is also true, however, 
that most of the panchayats in our sample have either one or zero projects active at 
all times during our study period. Let  ω t = 1 indicate that the active project at time t 
is a wage project, and  ω t = 0 that it is a piece-rate project. We represent the “shelf” 
of projects as an infinite stochastic stream of projects: at the beginning of each 
period a random project is drawn from the shelf with
(2)  ϕ ≡ P ( ω t = 1 |  ω t−1 ,  ω t−2 , …).
We suppose that all agents know ϕ but do not know exactly which projects will 
be implemented in the future. At the cost of a small loss of realism, this approach 
ensures that the dynamic environment is stationary and greatly simplifies the 
expression of comparative statics. It also permits a close analogy between the 
model and our empirical work, in which the fraction of future projects that are 
daily wage (a measure of ϕ) plays a key role. We treat ϕ as exogenous here since 
de jure it should be predetermined, but will also test below whether it responds to 
the wage change.
Each worker inelastically supplies one indivisible unit of labor in each period. 
We interpret a unit flexibly as either a day (in the case of daily-wage projects) or as 
a unit of output (in the case of piece-rate projects). Labor may be expended on an 
NREGS project or in the private sector, where worker i can earn  w _ t ( r _ t ). Let  n t ( q t ) 
be the number of days (output units) supplied to the project when  ω t = 1 ( ω t = 0), 
and let and  w i t ( r i t) be the wage (piece rate) that participating worker i receives. This 
need not equal the statutory wage  
_ w (the statutory piece rate  _ r ).
NREGS wages and employment levels emerge from bargaining between the offi-
cial and the workers. In principal workers have two sources of bargaining power: 
they can threaten to complain if the official pays them less than the statutory rate 
 
_ w ( _ r ), or can simply leave for the private sector and earn  w _ t ( r _ t ). Which of these 
threat points matters in practice is of course an empirical question. In a companion 
paper we study this issue in some detail; we find that the wages workers’ receive 
bear little relationship to the statutory wage but closely track variation in local 
market wages (Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2013). Motivated by these data, we model 
equilibrium wages and participation choices as tracking market wages ( w i t =  w _ t and 
 n t =  n t ( w _ t )). We further simplify matters by abstracting from time variation in the 
market wage, so  w _ t =  w _ and  n t = n.
Participation n and the average participant’s wage w (piece rate r) are thus prede-
termined once the official chooses how much work   nt to report. If the current project 
is a wage project, official’s period t rents will be
   y o t ( ω t = 1) = ( _ w − w) n + (  nt − n)  _ w , 3 3
 Underpayment Overreporting
and analogously if it is a piece-rate project,
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   y o t ( ω t = 0) = ( _ r − r) q + (  qt − q)  _ r . 3 3
 Underpayment Overreporting
The official can report up to  
_ n > n work-days, where  _ n is the number of registered 
workers in his village. Overreporting puts the official at risk of being detected by 
a superior and removed from office. The probability of detection on daily-wage 
projects is π(  n, n). We study the case where π(n, n) = 0 for any n so that there is 
no penalty for honesty, while  π 1 > 0 and  π 2 < 0 so that the probability of detection 
increases as the gap between   n and n widens. We also assume that π is such that the 
official’s problem has an interior optimum. Finally, we assume that if n > n′ then 
π((n + x), n) ≤ π((n′ + x), n′ ). This condition ensures that officials weakly prefer to 
have more people work on the project; it would be satisfied if, for example, the prob-
ability of detection depended on the total amount of overreporting or on the average 
rate of overreporting. The probability of detection on piece-rate projects is μ(  qt , q) 
for q ≤   q ≤  _ q and has analogous properties. If an official is caught he is removed 
from office before the beginning of the next period and earns a continuation payoff 
normalized to zero. In practice corrupt officials are sometimes suspended rather than 
fired; modeling this would affect our results only quantitatively.14, 15
The recursive formulation of the official’s objective function is
   
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) ≡ ϕV ( _ w , 1, ϕ) + (1 − ϕ) V ( _ w , 0, ϕ)
  V( _ w , 1, ϕ) ≡  max   n  [ ( _ w − w) n + (  n − n)   _ w + β  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) )  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) ] 
  V( _ w , 0, ϕ) ≡  max   q  [ ( _ r − r) q + (  q − q)   _ r + β  ( 1 − μ(  q,  q t ) )  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) ] ,
where V( _ w , 1) is the official’s expected continuation payoff in a period with a daily-
wage project, V( _ w , 0) is his expected continuation payoff in a period with a piece-
rate project, and  
_ V ( _ w ) is his expected continuation payoff unconditional on project 
type.
As a benchmark, consider first the effects of a hypothetical, temporary increase 
in the statutory daily wage. Because the official’s continuation value  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) is 
unaffected by this change it strictly increases overreporting on daily-wage projects 
(  nt − n). Intuitively, the wage change acts like a pure price shock for officials man-
aging daily-wage projects: the value of overreporting a day of work goes up, while 
the cost is unaffected. Consequently overreporting increases. Theft on piece-rate 
projects (  qt  _ r − qr) does not change, on the other hand, since neither the costs nor 
the benefits of stealing change.
14 Officials may also leave their posting for more benign reasons—a bureaucrat may be reassigned or a politi-
cian’s term may expire. Modeling this possibility would yield additional predictions: a bureaucrat near the end of 
his term may have weaker incentives to avoid detection, as suggested by Olson (2000). Campante, Chor, and Do 
(2009) provide a complementary analysis of the effects of exogenous changes in the probability of job retention. 
Unfortunately, we do not observe variation in tenure and so for simplicity we omit it from the model.
15 We model π as independent of the daily wage and other program parameters since incentives for monitor-
ing are not linked to other program parameters in our context. In Section IVE, we directly test for effects of  
_ w on 
monitoring and do not find any evidence of a relationship.
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Now consider the effects of a permanent increase in the statutory daily wage. 
Besides a static price effect, this also has a dynamic effect on the official’s con-
tinuation value  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ). Interestingly, this effect can potentially reverse the model’s 
predictions for daily-wage overreporting. Whether it does hinges on the elasticity of 
future rents with respect to  
_ w .
PROPOSITION 1: overreporting   nt − n on daily-wage projects is increasing in  _ w 
if    
_ w  _ 
 
_ V  
∂  _ V  _∂   _ w  < 1 and decreasing otherwise.
PROOF: 
Proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Intuitively, a higher wage raises the value of future overreporting, which in turn 
increases the importance of keeping one’s job. This effect dominates the price effect 
unless the elasticity of future benefits with respect to the wage is sufficiently small.16
While not easily refutable, Proposition 1 suggests two tests. First, we can exam-
ine the effects of a permanent wage change on forms of rent extraction that are not 
directly affected, such as theft from piece-rate projects. A higher statutory wage has 
no effect on current rent-extraction opportunities on piece-rate projects, but does 
increase expected future rents and thus discourages theft:
PROPOSITION 2: Total theft from piece-rate projects (  qt   _ r  − qr) is decreasing in   _ w .
This result is particularly interesting since many mechanisms—in which different 
kinds of corruption complement each other—could generate the opposite effect. For 
example, successful embezzlement might require fixed investments such as paying 
a superior officer to look the other way; in this case, an increase in the returns to 
one form of corruption might lead to an increase in other forms as well. Ultimately 
it is an empirical question whether alternative forms of corruption are substitutes or 
complements.
A second test exploits variation in the relative intensity of price and golden goose 
effects. Since the wage change only affects rents on future wage projects, we expect 
to see stronger effects in places with more future wage projects upcoming (higher ϕ). 
This turns out to be true if piece-rate and daily-wage projects are similarly lucrative:
PROPOSITION 3: restrict attention to any closed, bounded set of parameters 
(ϕ,  _ w ,  _ r ,  w _,  r _). Then for |  y o (1) −  y o (0) | sufficiently small,
    ∂ 
2 (  nt − n)  _∂   _ w ∂ ϕ  < 0 and  
 ∂ 2 (  qt   _ r − qr)  __∂   _ w ∂ ϕ  < 0.
The condition  y o (1) ≃  y o (0) matters because without it changes in ϕ generate 
“wealth effects” that can be additional sources of treatment heterogeneity. In our 
16 One can in fact can go further and construct examples (available on request) in which the total amount stolen 
per period decreases.
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empirical work we first verify that equilibrium rents from daily-wage and piece-
rate projects are similar, and then then test Proposition 3, using our data to estimate 
categories of ϕ.
A. Effects of Wages and monitoring
The results above characterize the effects of a wage reform to guide our empirical 
work. Earlier work, on the other hand, has emphasized the probability of audit and 
the official’s wage as key exogenous parameters. To relate our model to this litera-
ture we next characterize their effects.
To formalize the probability of an audit let π(  n, n) = γ  ˜ π (  n, n), where γ is the 
probability a daily-wage project is audited and  ˜ π the conditional probability of con-
viction. Then one can show that a one-period increase in γ decreases overreporting 
on daily-wage projects and has no effect on theft from piece-rate projects. A per-
manent increase in γ, on the other hand, generates a smaller decrease—or even an 
increase—in daily-wage overreporting, and increases theft from piece-rate projects. 
The contrast between these results yields a simple lesson for empirical work: the 
right interpretation of empirical evidence on the effects of a crackdown depends on 
whether officials perceived it to be temporary or permanent. In particular, tempo-
rary crackdowns generate larger reductions in corruption than permanent ones, and 
should thus be interpreted cautiously as guides to policymaking.
Efficiency wages, on the other hand, work here just as they would in a one-shot 
game. To see this let  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) = ϕV( _ w , 1, ϕ) + (1 − ϕ)V( _ w , 0, ϕ) + W where W ≥ 0 
is a wage premium paid to the official in each period until he is not dismissed. It is 
straightforward to show that all forms of corruption are decreasing in W. Intuitively, 
the efficiency wage has no price effects and only deterrent effects. As this example 
illustrates the theory’s novel predictions hinge not on dynamics per se but on the 
dynamic implications of future corrupt rents.
B. Alternative Substitution mechanisms
Some of our framework’s implications could also be generated by alternative sub-
stitution mechanisms. We conclude our theoretical discussion with a brief overview 
of these mechanisms and highlight a key distinction between them and the golden 
goose effect: the latter predicts that only future rent expectations, and not past rent 
realizations, affect current behavior. We will exploit this asymmetry below to exam-
ine which story best fits our data.
One possible substitution mechanism involves the “production function” for 
corruption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of corruption in our setting 
simply involves writing one number on paper instead of another. Suppose, how-
ever, that this requires the use of some scarce input that can be shifted across time 
(e.g., effort). Then the wage shock would induce officials to optimally reallocate 
this input across time, giving rise to patterns similar to those we predict. Second, if 
officials care about things other than consumption, then the wage shock might have 
income effects. The expectation of large future rents would lower the expected rela-
tive marginal utility of income now, leading to lower corruption. In an extreme case 
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of income effects officials might even “target” a particular income level. Finally, 
empirical tests could potentially be sensitive to issues of time aggregation. In our 
empirical work we treat the day as the basic unit of time, but monitoring might be 
based on less frequent observations. This would mechanically imply that officials 
expecting to steal more tomorrow would steal less today, since the probability of 
detection would depend on the sum of today’s report and tomorrow’s.
One difference between the golden goose effect and these mechanisms is that the 
former is purely forward-looking while the latter are time-symmetric, in that they pre-
dict that increases in both past and future corruption opportunities should reduce cor-
ruption today. Consider the “input” model: suppose that the official can extract rents 
r t today and  r t+1 tomorrow only if f  ( r t ,  r t+1 ) ≤ 0 for some increasing function f. 
Clearly any factor that increases  r t+1 must therefore decrease  r t , generating what 
might look like a golden goose effect. Similarly, however, any factor that increases 
r t must decrease  r t+1 , so that shocks to lagged rent extraction also negatively effect 
rent extraction today. An analogous argument applies to the monitoring story (for 
example, let the probability of an investigation be f  ( r t +  r t+1 )). Finally, consider 
a simple model with income effects in which officials maximize u( r t +  r t+1 ) − 
D( r t ,  r t+1 ) where u is an increasing, concave function and D is the expected nonmon-
etary disutility of punishments. (The income-targeting story is a limited case of this 
example.) Provided  D 12 is not too negative, changes in D that lower the cost of  r t+1 
will induce substitution away from  r t due to diminishing marginal utility (u″ < 0). 
This also implies the converse, however.
III. Empirical Approach
A. official Data
To test the theoretical predictions in Section II we adopt an audit approach, com-
paring official microdata on wage payments and program participation to original 
household survey data collected from the same (alleged) beneficiaries. The official 
data we use are publicly available on a central website (http://nrega.nic.in). Data 
available at the level of the individual worker include names, ages, addresses, caste 
status, and unique household jobcard number. Data available at the level of the work 
spell include number of days worked, name and identification number of the project 
worked on, and amount paid. Descriptive information on the nature of the projects 
and the names of the officials responsible for implementation are also available. It 
is straightforward to infer whether a project paid daily wages or piece rates because 
there are only a few allowed daily-wage rates.17 (Figure 1).
We used as our sample frame the official records for the states of Orissa and 
Andhra Pradesh as downloaded in January 2008, six months after our study period, 
to allow time for all the relevant data to be uploaded. As a cross-check, we also 
downloaded the official records a second time in March 2008. We found that the 
records for Orissa remained essentially unchanged, but that the number of work 
17 We designate a project as daily wage if more than 95 percent of the wages paid are these amounts.
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spells recorded for Andhra Pradesh increased by roughly 10 percent. These new 
observations were spread uniformly across space and time and so do not appear to 
have resulted from delays in processing records for specific panchayats or projects. 
They do, however, generate some uncertainty about the representativeness of our 
AP sample frame. We will emphasize the Orissa data and use AP as a control only 
in Table 5.
We sampled from the list of officially recorded NREGS work spells during the 
period March 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007 in Gajapati, Koraput, and Rayagada districts 
in Orissa. Within these districts, we restricted our attention to blocks at the border 
with AP. We sampled 60 percent of the Gram Panchayats within study blocks, strati-
fied by whether the position of GP chief executive had been reserved for women. 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 find evidence suggesting that reservations affect 
levels of corruption). Within these panchayats we sampled 2.8 percent of work 
spells, stratified by panchayat, by whether the project was implemented by the block 
or the panchayat administration, by whether the project was a daily-wage or piece-
rate project, and by whether the work spell was before or after the daily-wage shock. 
This yielded a total of 1,938 households. We set out to interview all adult members 
of these households about their NREGS participation, so that our measures of cor-
ruption would not be affected if work done by one member was mistakenly reported 
as having been done by another. Details on survey results and a sample description 
are in Appendix B.
B. Survey coverage
We asked respondents retroactively about spells of work they did between 
March 1, 2007 and June 30, 2007. A spell of work is a well-defined concept within 
the NREGS: it is an uninterrupted period of up to two weeks employment on a 
single project. For each spell we asked subjects the dates during which they worked, 
the number of days worked, what project they worked on, whether they were paid 
on a piece-rate or daily-wage basis, what payment they received, and in the case 
of piece-rate projects what quantity of work they did. In addition to the survey of 
program participants, we also administered a separate questionnaire to village elders 
with questions on labor market conditions, agricultural seasons, and official visits 
in the village.
While imperfect recall could potentially be a concern given the lag between the 
study period and our survey, we designed the survey instrument and trained enu-
merators to jog respondents’ memories: for example, using major holidays as ref-
erence points. The results were encouraging: we obtained information on at least 
the month in which work was done for 93 percent of the spells in our sample. We 
do not find significant differential recall problems over time: in a variety of speci-
fications including location fixed effects and individual controls such as age and 
education, subjects’ estimated probability of recalling exact dates increases by only 
0.7 percent—2.2 percent per month and is not statistically significant. Since our 
main tests exploit discrete time-series changes while controlling for smooth trends, 
these patterns should not introduce bias. Subjects’ recall was facilitated by the fact 
that the NREGS was a new and salient program, and spells of work were likely to 
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be memorable and distinct compared to other employment. Subjects are also more 
likely to keep track of their participation and compensation given that they do not 
necessarily get paid what they are owed or on time. The one place where recall does 
matter is that recipients do have difficulty recalling the quantity of work done on 
piece-rate projects—the amount of earth they moved, volume of rocks they split, 
etc. Consequently, in our empirical work, we treat theft on piece-rate projects as 
unitary (  qt   _ r −  q t r t in terms of the model).
Survey interviews were framed to minimize other potential threats to the accu-
racy and veracity of respondents’ self-reports. We made clear that we were conduct-
ing academic research and did not work for the government, to discourage them 
from claiming fictitious underpayment; in the end most respondents reported that 
they had been paid what they thought they were owed. None of the interviewed 
households have income close to the taxable level and will have ever paid income 
taxes, so there are no tax motives for underreporting. Conversely, officials had little 
need to secure workers’ collusion in their overreporting. A worker could only sup-
ply a signature, which has little relevance when most people cannot write their own 
name. There is also no reason to believe that respondents would underreport corrup-
tion for fear of reprisals, since they could not have known how many days they were 
reported as having worked in the official data. Finally and most importantly, there 
is no reason to think any of these issues would lead to differential biases (which 
would affect our results) and not just level ones (which would not). Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar (2013) confirms that the wage shock had no effect on the self-reported 
variables we use in our analysis.
C. Empirical Specifications
Our empirical analysis includes all spells of work from our survey data that con-
tain information on at least the month of the spell, the number of days worked, 
and the wages received. We impute start or end dates if unavailable, and construct 
time-series of survey reports of work done and wages paid by aggregating data at 
the panchayat-day level for the sample period. We distribute days worked equally 
over the month if neither start nor end date are available, and equally in the period 
between the start date and end date if the number of days worked is less than the 
period between the start and end dates. Table C1 gives a numerical example of the 
construction of our dependent variables. Similarly, we construct time-series of the 
official data by aggregating official reports of work done and wage paid of only those 
households who we interviewed or confirmed as fictitious over the sample period. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main outcome variables; the discrep-
ancy between official and survey amounts is stark, but at leakage rates of around 
75 percent within the range of corruption estimates across developing nations, other 
programs in India, as well as other estimates of corruption in NREGS in Orissa.18
18 For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) find rates of 87 percent in a schooling program in Uganda, while 
Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) find leakage of up to 55 percent in a schooling program in Brazil. In the Indian 
context, Khera (2011) finds leakage rates of almost 90 percent in the flagship food subsidy program (TPDS) in 
Bihar, while a study done by an NGO (Center for Science and Environment) on corruption in the NREGS in Orissa 
found almost precisely the same numbers (75 percent).
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Our first empirical strategy is to regress officially reported outcomes   ypt for pan-
chayat p and day t on actual outcomes  y pt as reported by participants, an indicator 
Shoc k t for the post May 1 period, and a number of time-varying controls sum-
marized by  T t including a polynomial in day-of-year to capture long-term trends, 
a polynomial in day-of-month to capture periodicity, and an indicator for major 
holidays. Certain specifications also include regression-discontinuity type controls 
where the Shock indicator is interacted with time trends. Finally, we include indica-
tors for political reservations  R p and in some specifications district fixed effects  δ d(p) 
to capture variation in program implementation across locations:19
(3)    ypt =  β 0 +  β 1  y pt +  β 2 Shoc k t +  T t ′ γ +  R p ′ ζ +  δ d( p) +  ϵ pt .
Standard errors are clustered at the panchayat as well as the day level using multi-
way clustering. Note that if   ypt were correlated one-for-one with  y pt , then this 
approach would be equivalent to using   ypt −  y pt as the dependent variable, while if 
not our approach is less restrictive. We have also implemented the more restrictive 
approach, however, and the results are if anything stronger (see Table 6 and the dis-
cussion in Section IVD).
Identification in (3) rests on the assumption that unobserved factors affect-
ing   ypt are orthogonal to Shoc k t after controlling for the other regressors. To relax 
this assumption we also exploit data from the neighboring district of Vizianagaram 
in Andhra Pradesh to control for unobserved time-varying effects common to the 
geographic region under study. There are, however, several caveats. First, we can 
only implement this strategy when studying piece-rate theft, since essentially all 
projects in Andhra Pradesh are piece rate. Second, as noted above a substantial 
number of new observations appeared in the official Vizianagaram records after we 
selected our sample. Finally, Andhra Pradesh made two revisions to its schedule of 
piece rates during our sample period, the latter of which took effect on March 25, 
2007. Because of its proximity to the daily-wage change in Orissa this shock limits 
19 Key political positions in some villages are reserved by law for women and/or ethnic minorities.
Table 1—Summary Statistics of Main Regression Variables
Observations Mean SD
Official DW days 13,054 3.31 6.30
Actual DW days 13,054 0.88 1.55
Official PR payments 7,320 94.08 259.70
Actual PR payments 7,320 12.96 43.43
FwdWageFrac 13,908 0.67 0.40
Notes: This table provides summary descriptions of the aggregated variables used in the main 
result Tables 3 and 4. The sample for each kind of project includes panchayats that had at least 
one of that kind of project active during the study period (March 1 through June 30, 2007). 
“Official DW Days” is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported 
officially. “Actual DW Days” is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as 
reported by survey respondents. “Official PR Rate” is the total payments by panchayat-day on 
piece-rate projects as reported officially, while “Actual PR Rate” corresponds to the same fig-
ure as reported by survey respondents. “FwdWageFrac” is the proportion of project-days in the 
next two months in a panchayat that are daily wage.
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the value of Andhra Pradesh as a control for high-frequency confounds, although it 
is still useful for low-frequency ones. Keeping these limitations in mind, we estimate
(4)    ypt =  β 0 +  β 1  y pt +  β 2 orshoc k t × o r p +  β 3 APShock 1 t × A P p 
 +  β 4 APShock  2 t × A P p +  β 5 orshoc k t +  β 6 APShock  1 t 
 +  β 7 APShock  2 t + o r p +  T t ′ γ +  R p ′ ζ +  δ d( p) +  ϵ pt ,
where o r p (A P p ) indicates panchayats in Orissa (Andhra Pradesh). The coefficient 
of interest in this specification is  β 2 , the differential change in corruption in the post-
shock period in Orissa.
To test for the differential effects of the wage change predicted by Proposition 3 
we need an empirical analogue to ϕ, the probability that a future project in our 
model is a daily-wage project. Given that many of the panchayats in our data only 
implement wage projects, we partition the set of panchayats into those that do and 
do not ever run piece-rate projects and estimate
(5)    ypt =  β 0 +  β 1  y pt +  β 2 Shoc k t +  β 3 Shoc k t × AlwaysD W pt 
 +  β 4 AlwaysD W pt +  T t ′ γ +  R p ′ ζ +  δ d(p) +  ϵ pt 
for daily-wage outcomes. Our model predicts  β 2 > 0 while  β 3 < 0. We can also 
apply a similar idea to piece-rate outcomes, replacing AlwaysDW with AlwaysPr. 
In this case we expect  β 2 < 0 while  β 3 > 0.
While specification (5) has a simple differences-in-differences interpretation, we 
can obtain a more stringest test of the theory by isolating the differential response 
attributable only to future daily-wage projects. To do this we must define, for every 
panchayat and every day, the proportion of upcoming work that is daily wage. We 
accomplish this by (1) defining a “project-day” as a day on which a particular proj-
ect is running, where a project is running if work on that project as been reported 
in the past and will be reported in the future, and then (2) calculating for each 
panchayat-day observation the fraction FwdWageFrac of project-days in the upcom-
ing two months that are daily wage project-days. Figure 2 plots the distribution of 
FwdWageFrac in our sample. Given the existence of clear mass points at zero and 
one we adopt a flexible approach, binning the data into three categories: one where 
FwdWageFrac  =  0 (the omitted category), one where 0  <  FwdWageFrac  <  1 
(FdwSome), and one where FwdWageFrac  =  1 (FdwAll).20 We then allow the 
effects of the wage change to vary across these categories:
(6)   ypt =  β 0 +  β 1  y pt +  β 2 Shoc k t +  β 3 Shoc k t × FdwAl l pt +  β 4 FdwAl l pt 
 +  β 5 Shoc k t × FdwSom e pt +  β 6 FdwSom e pt +  T t ′ γ +  R p ′ ζ +  δ d( p) +  ϵ pt .
20 We have also estimated more restrictive models in which FwdWageFrac enters linearly and obtained qualita-
tively similar results (available on request).
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Note that a key goal in constructing these forward-looking measures is to cap-
ture variation in the proportion of daily-wage projects on the panchayat’s “shelf” 
of projects without also including endogenous variation in the amount of work 
reported. This is the reason that we focus on whether projects are ongoing, rather 
than the number of person-days of work purportedly done. We show below that the 
FwdWageFrac variable is indeed uncorrelated with the wage shock. It is also impor-
tant to note that if it were endogenously related to the wage change we would expect 
the resulting bias to work against us rather than for us: panchayats that increased 
their corruption most in response to the shock would be the most likely to switch to 
wage projects, generating a positive bias on the interaction term.
To provide more insight into whether past opportunities for corruption matter 
in the same way as future opportunities, we construct bins based on an analogous 
measure BkWageFrac of the fraction of project-days in the preceeding two months 
that were daily wage and estimate:21
(7)   ypt =  β 0 +  β 1  y pt +  β 2 Shoc k t +  β 3 Shoc k t × FdwAl l pt +  β 4 Shoc k t × BdwAl l pt 
 +  β 5 Shoc k t × FdwSom e pt +  β 6 Shoc k t × BdwSom e pt 
 +  β 7 FdwAl l pt +  β 8 BdwAl l pt +  β 9 FdwSom e pt +  β 10 BdwSom e pt 
 +  T t ′ γ +  R p ′ ζ +  δ d(p) +  ϵ pt .
Our model predicts  β 3 < 0 with no prediction about  β 4 , while if time-symmetric 
mechanisms are important then we should see  β 3 ≃  β 4 < 0.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our regressions.
21 The correlation between FwdWageFrac and BkWageFrac is 0.75 within district, 0.6 within blocks, and 0.11 
within panchayats; between FwdWageFrac and the current daily-wage fractions, the correlations are 0.85, 0.76, and 
0.41, respectively. The results must be interpreted with these correlations in mind.
Figure 2. Distribution of Future Daily-Wage Project Fraction
Note: Plots distribution of projects in study panchayats by the fraction of projects in the subse-
quent two months that were daily-wage projects.
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IV. Results: The Golden Goose Effect
A. Preliminaries: Wages, Projects, and rents
We begin with tests of the main identifying assumptions. Figure 3 shows that the 
policy change was actually implemented: the average wage rate officially claimed 
on daily-wage projects hovers near Rs 55 until May 1 and then jumps up sharply 
thereafter. Interestingly, it does not immediately or permanently reach the new statu-
tory wage of Rs 70. This is because not all panchayats implemented the change—
some continued to claim the old rates after May 1, likely because they were not 
immediately informed about the change.22, 23 We also examined changes in the use 
of the “skilled” wage categories after May 1 and found a small decrease in the 
 proportion of wage spells for which skilled wages were claimed, from 7.5 percent 
prior to May 1 to 6.3 percent after May 1. While we cannot reliably assess the “true” 
skill level of any given spell, this decrease is consistent with the hypothesis that 
there is some skill inflation going on and that golden goose effects led officials to do 
less of it after the wage change.
Figure 3 also reveals that the wage rate actually received by workers was unaffected 
by the shock; if anything it trends slightly downwards, though this effect is largely 
compositional and disappears once we control for district effects. In a  companion 
paper we examine the determination of actual wages in some detail (Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar 2013). We find, inter alia, that while 72 percent of respondents were 
22 In Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013), we show that panchayats that are closer to block and district offices are 
more likely to implement the wage change.
23 This interpretation suggests an additional test: all our predictions should hold only in panchayats that actually 
implemented the wage change. We pursued this strategy, but unfortunately there are insufficiently many nonimple-
menting panchayats for us to precisely estimate the difference.
Figure 3. Daily-Wage Rates Paid
Notes: Plots a daily series of the average wage rate paid in daily-wage projects in Orissa over 
the study period, according to official records and survey data. Day 60 corresponds to March 1, 
2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1, 2007, the date of the wage shock; and 
day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period.
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aware that the wage had changed and 81 percent of these correctly identified the new 
wage, these “aware” workers did not earn higher wages after May 1 relative to their 
less-aware peers. Similarly, literate workers were no more likely to see their wages 
increase. For further analysis and interpretation of these facts we refer the reader to 
Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013); our analysis here will focus on testing our theoreti-
cal predictions about overreporting, taking the observed wage dynamics as given.24, 25
Second, we check whether preshock rent extraction from daily-wage and piece-
rate projects are similar, as predicated by Proposition 3. Dividing total theft in the 
two categories of projects by the number of actual days worked on those projects, 
we find that the rate of theft per day worked is very similar preshock; Rs 236 per 
actual day worked in daily-wage projects as opposed to Rs 221 in piece-rate proj-
ects.26 This is important both because it allows us to test Proposition 3 and also 
because it implies that officials would have had little incentive to distort project 
types prior to the wage change.
Finally, we check whether project shelf composition responds endogenously to 
the wage shock. In principal it is fixed at the start of the fiscal year (March 2007), 
but if officials had scope to reclassify or re-order projects they might have priori-
tized wage projects. In fact, the fraction of projects that are daily wage fell from 
74 percent before May 1 to 72 percent afterwards. More formally, Table 2 reports 
regressions of FwdWageFrac on an indicator for the shock along with time controls. 
The point estimates are insignificant and correspond to a 0.02 standard deviation 
change in project composition. These results corroborate the testimony of block-
level officials that the shelf of projects and payment schemes is predetermined. They 
are also natural given that changing the designation of project is a relatively observ-
able form of cheating.
In unreported results we also examined whether project shelf composition is cor-
related with key political variables like reservations for women and minorities at the 
sarpanch and samiti representative level; with the number of locally active NGOs; 
with village elders’ perceptions of the relative wealth and relative political activism 
of the village; and with indicators for visits from block and district officials. In gen-
eral we found no significant correlations; the one exception we uncovered was the 
correlation with the share of the population belonging to scheduled castes, and since 
very few scheduled castes live in our study area this explains very little variation 
in the shelf. We have also included these characteristics directly as controls in our 
regressions and they do not change our findings (available on request).
24 Another intriguing feature of Figure 3 is that during the first month of our study period workers were on 
average overpaid. This pattern is driven by observations from Gajapati district where prevailing market wages were 
higher than the statutory program wage. If officials do not pay this prevailing market wage, workers will not partici-
pate in the program. If workers do not participate, officials cannot extract rents. Hence, according to local NGOs, 
officials in such areas overpay workers for participation, even though they report the correct statutory program wage 
on official reports, making up the difference by overreporting days worked.
25 Cross-sectional variation in wages suggests another potential test of the golden goose effect: we would expect 
to see officials taking more risk in locations where the market wage  w _ is larger relative to the statutory wage  _ w . In 
results available on request we find that rent extraction is indeed (insignificantly) higher in panchayats with lower 
market wages, as predicted by their endowments of land and labor.
26 These figures are scaled to reflect misreporting of days worked as daily-wage projects when, in fact, they were 
designated as piece-rate projects in the official data. In general, this kind of misreporting is rare: 82 percent of spells 
are reported correctly, whereas 15 percent of piece-rate spells are reported as daily-wage spells.
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B. overreporting of Days Worked in Daily-Wage Projects
We begin our core analysis by examining the reported number of days worked 
on daily-wage projects. Figure 4 shows the evolution of overreporting over time—
i.e., the difference between the number of days of work reported by officials and by 
households. Note that the sharp downward spikes generally occur on major holidays, 
suggesting that officials perceive overreporting on holidays as particularly risky. 
The superimposed fitted models summarize an exploratory regression-discontinuity 
analysis: we fit polynomials in day-of-year to the aggregate time series and allowed 
the coefficients to vary before and after the wage change took effect on  May 1. The 
fitted models suggest that there was a slight increase in daily-wage overreporting 
following the shock. This may seem surprising given the obvious effect of the wage 
hike on incentives for overreporting, but as Proposition 1 suggests there may also be 
a countervailing dynamic effect.
Columns 1–3 in panel A of Table 3 present a disaggregated analysis based on 
equation (3). Column 1 presents estimates of the basic specification (equation (3)) 
with a linear time trend and no location effects; column 2 adds district fixed effects, 
while column 3 adds a linear trend interacted with the shock term. Consistently 
across these specifications we find that official reports are significantly higher when 
more actual work was done and, conditional on actual work done, significantly 
lower on major holidays (not reported). The estimated impact of the wage shock, 
on the other hand, is positive but not significant in each specification. To examine 
whether this is due to an offsetting dynamic effect, columns 4–6 of panel A separate 
panchayats that ran solely daily-wage projects from those that also ran piece-rate 
projects (equation (5)). We find a differential reduction in overreporting in the daily-
wage only panchayats, significant at the 10 percent level; summing the point esti-
mates implies a small reduction in overreporting in these locations. In contrast, the 
estimated effect of the wage change in panchayats that ran at least some  piece-rate 
Table 2—Wage Shock Effects on Project Composition
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Shock 0.014 0.007 0.008
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Day 0.001 0.001 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Day2 0.002
(0.001)
District FEs N Y Y
Observations 12,103 12,103 12,103
 r 2 0.046 0.097 0.098
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
“FwdWageFrac,” the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two 
months. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “Day” is a linear time 
trend; Day2 has been rescaled by the mean of Day. All columns include a third-order polyno-
mial in the day of the month and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust standard 
errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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projects is larger and significant in column 4. This suggests the presence of a substi-
tution effect that is muting the overall impact of the wage change.
To further isolate the portion of this differential effect that is attributable to hav-
ing future daily-wage projects, and in order to test Proposition 3, columns 1–3 of 
panel B report estimates of the interaction between the wage shock and categories of 
our constructed FwdWageFrac measure (equation (6)). The estimated direct effect 
of the wage hike increases again and is significant at the 5 percent level; the interpre-
tation is that this is the price effect that would obtain in a panchayat with no future 
daily-wage projects planned. Note that this result also rules out  alternative explana-
tion based on strong diminishing marginal returns to income, such as income “tar-
geting.” The differential effect in panchayats with solely wage projects upcoming 
is negative and significant at the 10 percent level, while the differential effect in 
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Figure 4. Daily Wage Corruption Measures with Discontinuous Polynomial Fits
Notes: Plots daily series of the total amount of overreporting of work days on daily wage proj-
ects. Day 60 corresponds to March 1, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1, 
2007, the date of the wage shock; and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period. 
Discrepancies were calculated by subtracting the quantities reported by survey respondents 
from those reported in official records. Superimposed solid lines represent fitted regression dis-
continuity models with linear (panel A) and quadratic (panel B) terms in day-of-year; dotted 
lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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panchayats with a mix of upcoming projects is negative but insignificant, providing 
support for Proposition 3.27
To better understand what drives these patterns of substitution, columns 4–6 of 
panel B present specifications that allow for both the future and the past to predict 
responsiveness to the shock (equation (7)). The direct effect of the shock remains 
positive and is significant. The differential change in corruption in panchayats 
with only daily-wage projects upcoming is negative, larger, and highly significant, 
27 One potential concern about these results is that intertemporal substitution occurs mechanically because of 
the 100 day limit on participation per household-year. In practice, however, we found that this limit was rarely 
reached. During fiscal year 2006–2007 only 4 percent of jobcards in our study area in Orissa reached 100 days, and 
all panchayats in our sample had a significant number of jobcards with less than 100 days—95 percent of the cards 
on average and at a minimum 22 percent.
Table 3—Wage Shock Effects on Daily-Wage Reports
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock 0.95 0.94 0.89 1.30* 1.29 1.24
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.79) (0.79) (0.80)
Shock × AlwaysDW −1.75* −1.74* −1.75*
(1.00) (0.98) (0.99)
AlwaysDW 2.12** 2.27*** 2.28***
(0.83) (0.86) (0.86)
Observations 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810
 r 2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock 2.39** 2.31** 2.25** 3.05** 3.00** 3.00**
(0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (1.22) (1.23) (1.23)
Shock × FdwAll −1.94* −1.84* −1.80* −4.03*** −3.78*** −3.78***
(1.07) (1.07) (1.07) (1.38) (1.36) (1.37)
Shock × FdwSome −1.15 −1.12 −1.08 −0.21 −0.17 −0.17
(1.03) (1.03) (1.02) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
Shock × BdwAll 2.27 2.13 2.12
(1.50) (1.46) (1.47)
Shock × BdwSome −1.99** −2.03** −2.03**
(0.94) (0.97) (0.97)
Observations 11,386 11,386 11,386 10,651 10,651 10,651
 r 2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14
Time controls Day Day Shock × Day Day Day Shock × Day
District FEs N Y Y N Y Y
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of days of 
daily-wage work officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to one on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 
and 6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysDW” is a panchayat that had a daily-wage 
project active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to one if the proportion of daily wage project-days in 
the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two 
months. “FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 
0 but less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include 
controls for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a 
third-order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the pan-
chayat chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and 
day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 confirming a strong  substitution pattern. The analogous differential change for pan-
chayats that had only run daily-wage projects in the past is positive and insignificant, 
which is inconsistent with time-symmetric interpretations of our forward-looking 
estimates. We do estimate a significant negative differential effect in panchayats that 
had implemented a mix of projects in the past, however. In contrast to the forward-
looking results, this result is not robust to replacing categories of the FwdWageFrac 
variable with the variable itself in our empirical model (not reported). This, and the 
fact that we do not find differential drops in panchayats with only wage projects in 
the past, lead us to treat it with some caution.
C. Theft in Piece-rate Projects
We turn next to theft from piece-rate projects. This margin of corruption pro-
vides an attractive test for golden goose effects because it was not directly affected 
by the wage change, so that only dynamic effects should apply (Proposition 2). 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the gap between official and actual payments on 
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Figure 5. Piece Rate Corruption Measures with Discontinuous Polynomial Fits
Notes: Plots daily series of the total amount of theft on piece rate projects. Day 60 corresponds to 
March 1, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1, 2007, the date of the wage shock; 
and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period. Discrepancies were calculated by 
subtracting the quantities reported by survey respondents from those reported in official records. 
Superimposed solid lines represent fitted regression discontinuity models with linear (panel A) and 
quadratic (panel B) terms in day-of-year; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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piece-rate projects over the sample period, again with fitted  regression-discontinuity 
specifications superimposed. Theft was unusually low in May following the wage 
shock; indeed, officially reported payments fell while actual payments rose. The fit-
ted models reflect this, consistently estimating a significant discrete drop on May 1. 
Note also that theft rebounded in June; while various factors could be at play, this is 
also broadly consistent with a dynamic model since NREGS projects largely cease 
operation during the monsoons starting in late June in Orissa. This implies that 
future rent expectations were falling steadily through May and June.
Turning to a disaggregated analysis, Table 4 mirrors Table 3 but with the total 
reported payments on piece-rate projects as the dependent variable and total actual 
payments on piece-rate projects as a predictor. In column 1 of panel A, the main effect 
of the wage shock is negative and significant at the 5 percent level,  providing strong 
Table 4—Wage Shock Effects on Piece-Rate Reports
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock −78.31** −78.43* −75.9* −81.76** −82.18** −79.87**
(39.91) (40.29) (40.08) (40.26) (40.66) (40.58)
Shock × AlwaysPr 15.44 16.64 17.58
(50.43) (49.80) (49.36)
AlwaysPr −35.29 −33.19 −33.58
(33.87) (34.83) (34.73)
Observations 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076
 r 2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock −38.58 −40.47 −38.18 −63.69 −62.16 −60.53
(67.50) (66.52) (67.18) (73.19) (72.35) (72.34)
Shock × FdwAll −24.88 −20.36 −23.75 −44.14 −31.83 −39.19
(69.39) (67.39) (68.79) (93.40) (90.06) (93.11)
Shock × FdwSome −74.61 −73.94 −72.84 −74.85 −73.83 −73.46
(72.18) (69.87) (69.81) (95.70) (94.34) (94.20)
Shock × BdwAll 109.23 105.72 113.68
(81.61) (81.84) (84.81)
Shock × BdwSome 11.94 5.17 8.55
(89.23) (89.35) (90.37)
Observations 6,543 6,543 6,543 6,209 6,209 6,209
 r 2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12
Time controls Day Day Shock×Day Day Day Shock×Day
District FEs N Y Y N Y Y
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid on 
piece-rate projects officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and 
6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysPr” is a panchayat that had a piece rate project 
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to one if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the pan-
chayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. 
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but 
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include con-
trols for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a third-
order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat 
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day 
are presented in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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support for Proposition 2. The magnitude of the coefficient—about Rs 78 per day—
is also economically meaningful compared to the average theft per  panchayat-day 
observation prior to the shock of Rs 102. Columns 2–3 show that while the coeffi-
cient does not change much, standard errors are slightly larger and the result is hence 
significant at the 10 percent level. Columns 4–6 again separate those panchayats that 
ran only piece-rate projects from those that ran both types of projects; as expected 
the coefficient on the interaction terms is positive, though insignificant. The esti-
mated change in panchayats with both kinds of projects is larger and more precisely 
estimated. Note that the sum of the coefficient on the shock and the interaction term 
is not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the shock itself 
had no effect on panchayats that only ran piece-rate projects.
As before, panel B adds interactions between the shock and the forward and 
backward fraction of daily-wage projects. As with daily-wage overreporting we find 
a negative differential effect of the shock in panchayats with all projects in the future 
being daily wage, and a positive coefficient on the interaction between the shock 
and past high daily-wage fractions. None of these estimates are statistically signifi-
cant, however. In general our power to estimate piece-rate effects is limited by the 
relative scarcity of piece-rate projects in Orissa. (For example, even the indicator 
for holidays, which is consistently statistically significant in daily-wage models, 
is imprecisely estimated in piece-rate models). Overall the estimated differential 
effects provide only suggestive evidence.
To obtain a more powerful test for Proposition 2 and address concerns about 
time-varying confounds we next use Andhra Pradesh as a control. Table 5 reports 
estimates of equation (4), the difference-in-differences specification. The Orissa-
specific effect of the daily-wage shock in Orissa is negative, larger than the 
first-differences estimate, and significant across all specifications. Subject to the 
caveats described above, these estimates support the golden goose hypothesis.
D. robustness checks
For our preferred estimators, we use the fraction of daily wage project-days in the 
upcoming two months as the key interaction variable. A two-month window is sen-
sible on several grounds. First, longer forecasts of project shelf composition would 
not likely be relevant given that (i) the tenure of bureaucrats in the relevant post-
ings is quite short (approximately a year), and (ii) very little NREGS activity takes 
place once the monsoon season starts in earnest. Second, as per program guidelines 
official reports are aggregated bi-weekly, so that it is plausible for an official to be 
detected and punished within a two-month window. Nevertheless, columns 1 and 2 
(6 and 7) of Table 6 examine the sensitivity of the daily-wage (piece-rate) results 
to using one-month and three-month windows. Results using a one-month window 
are similar and if anything stronger than our baseline estimates. Results using a 
three-month window are somewhat smaller and not statistically significant but are 
qualitatively similar, as one would expect if the three-month window absorbs large 
periods of very little NREGS activity during the monsoon season.
Another issue has to do with the exact timing of the effects we are attributing to 
the May 1 policy change. Equation (6) implicitly assumes that the dynamic effects 
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of the wage change take effect at the same point in time as the static ones. If, how-
ever, officials learned about the wage change before it took place then dynamic 
effects might begin earlier than the direct, static ones. The May 1 wage change 
we study was the culmination of a process that began on January 10 with the pub-
lication of a proposal to change wages, and it is possible that officials acquired 
information over time about whether or not the proposal would be implemented. 
To explore whether our causal interpretation of the coefficients on the post-May 
indicator is correct we reran our main specifications using more flexible functions 
of time. Columns 4 and 9 of Table 6 report results using indicators for each month 
(we ran similar specifications using bi-weekly dummies and reached similar conclu-
sions). In general the estimates are imprecise. There is some evidence—significant 
for piece-rate theft—that the differential effect of FwdWageFrac categories (though 
not the direct effect of the shock) begins earlier in April. This is consistent with the 
view that at least some officials learned about the wage change before it took place 
and began adjusting accordingly.
We have also examined the sensitivity of the results to allowing for quadratic trend 
controls; an analogous set of tables in Appendix C reports these estimates (results 
for even higher-order trend controls available on request). Higher-order polynomials 
have little effect on any of our results. Another alternative  interpretation is that the 
Table 5—Effects on Piece-Rate Reports Using Andhra Pradesh as a Control
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
or Shock × OR −87.86** −87.90** −87.54**
(38.81) (38.77) (38.86)
AP Shock 1 × AP −21.29 −21.45 −21.03
(30.09) (29.99) (30.14)
AP Shock 2 × AP 117.84*** 117.95*** 119.38***
(33.87) (33.83) (34.05)
or Shock 31.15 31.40 53.64
(32.51) (32.38) (32.88)
AP Shock 1 61.08** 60.69** 23.38
(27.42) (27.50) (25.78)
AP Shock 2 −24.34 −24.71 −63.81**
(25.89) (25.85) (26.00)
Actual PR payments 0.19** 0.19** 0.19**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Time controls Day Day Shock×Day
FEs State District District
Observations 16,470 16,470 16,470
 r 2 0.06 0.06 0.06
Notes: This table uses data from both Orissa (OR) and Andhra Pradesh (AP). Each obser-
vation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid 
out on piece-rate projects as officially reported. “or Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and 
after May 1, 2007; in column 3, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AP 
Shock 1” is an indicator equal to one on and after March 5, 2007, while “AP Shock 2” equals 
one on or after April 25, 2007. All columns include a third-order polynomial in the day of the 
month, an indicator for major holidays, and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust 
standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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wage shock did have differential effects but that these were driven by other variables 
correlated with project shelf composition. The leading concern in this context would 
be a relationship with the reservation of key political posts for women or disadvan-
taged minorities. We checked earlier that shelf composition was not significantly 
correlated with reservations, and these are also included as controls in all our speci-
fications. We can further include interactions between reservation categories and the 
wage change directly as controls in our regressions: this makes the daily-wage results 
stronger, while leaving piece-rate results unchanged. (Results available on request).
Finally, we examine the effects of using the difference   ypt −  y pt between official 
and actual quantities as the dependent variable. Recall that this is equivalent to our 
approach if the true relationship between those quantities is linear with slope one, 
but otherwise is more restrictive. In practice, imposing that restriction makes little 
Table 6—Robustness Checks
Daily wage Piece rate
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shock 2.03** 1.69** 2.44** −69.45 −26.96 −37.90
(0.89) (0.84) (0.97) (65.13) (75.21) (67.03)
Shock × FdwAll −1.75* −1.35 −1.94* 1.98 −44.15 −22.86
(0.99) (1.04) (1.09) (63.27) (77.92) (68.91)
Shock × FdwSome −1.28 −0.33 −1.19 −51.87 −96.82 −81.61
(0.92) (0.98) (1.04) (64.72) (80.02) (72.31)
April 0.29 103.47
(1.25) (67.50)
May 2.76 42.39
(1.77) (76.83)
June 3.37 205.76
(2.24) (154.60)
April × FdwAll −0.35 −125.72** 
(1.41) (57.67)
May × FdwAll −1.75 −39.77
(1.71) (50.69)
June × FdwAll −2.60 −167.24
(1.92) (119.43)
Time window (months) 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 2
Observations 10,740 11,740 11,386 11,386 6,250 6,653 6,543 6,543
r2 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in columns 1–3 is the number of days of daily-
wage work officially reported; in column 4, the difference between this quantity and the number of days of daily-
wage work reported by participants; in columns 5–7, the total amount paid out on piece-rate projects as officially 
reported; and in column 8, the difference between this quantity and the total amount paid out on piece-rate projects 
as reported by participants. “Shock” is an indicator equal to one on and after May 1, 2007. “FdwAll” is equal to one 
if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1. “FdwSome” is 
equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but less than 1. All 
columns include controls for the actual quantities of work done/amounts received, a linear time trend, an indica-
tor for major holidays, a third-order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, 
and indicators for the panchayat chief seat being reserved for a minority group except columns 3 and 7 which omit 
the polynomial in day-of-month. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented 
in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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difference for the results (columns 4 and 8). We have also used the difference in total 
amounts extracted as the dependent variables, and as Table 7 shows again the results 
are very similar. This table also shows various other outcome variables: the total 
rents combined from piece-rate and daily-wage projects, as well as official reports 
for only “fictitious” households. The daily-wage results for the fictitious households 
are strongly statistically significant.
E. Is monitoring Affected?
Another potential concern is that the intensity with which officials were moni-
tored by their supervisors changed around the same time as the daily-wage change. 
If panchayats with more wage projects upcoming experienced the largest increases 
in scrutiny this could explain the role of FwdWageFrac categories in predicting 
responses to the wage shock. Of course, if this were true then again one would 
expect BkWageFrac categories to play a similar role. Moreover, there is no a priori 
reason to expect monitoring intensity to change: official notifications and instruc-
tions regarding the wage change did not include any provisions regarding monitor-
ing, and officials at the block and panchayat level do not have implicit incentives 
to monitor linked to the amount of corruption (for example, it is not the case that 
a detecting official earns a reward proportional to the amount the detected official 
stole). Nevertheless, one would like direct evidence on this point.
Table 7—Additional Outcome Variables
DW+PR Daily wage Piece rate
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Shock 105.40 138.55 174.64** 1.21 0.79 −25.30 −34.97
(82.45) (97.14) (77.29) (1.17) (0.84) (39.99) (48.18)
Shock × FdwAll −73.79 −69.49* −192.76*** −1.78** −0.88*** 7.89 −5.96
(94.20) (38.02) (36.61) (0.74) (0.33) (80.37) (76.89)
Shock × FdwSome −95.45 −39.40 22.35 0.08 −0.26*** 3.76 −16.41
(95.29) (36.79) (69.19) (0.21) (0.03) (53.23) (36.14)
Time controls Day Day Shock×Day Day Day Day Day
Fixed effects District District District District District District District
Observations 12,103 11,386 10,651 9,885 10,433 5,614 5,828
r2 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in column 1 is total extraction from daily-wage 
and piece-rate projects. In columns 2–3 it is the total value extracted from daily-wage projects. In columns 4–7 
it is the number of daily-wage work done or piece-rate amounts for “fictitious” households as officially reported. 
“Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage 
project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion 
of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but less than 1. All columns include controls for 
the actual quantities of work done/amounts received, a linear time trend, an indicator for major holidays, a third-
order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat 
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day 
are presented in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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To test for changes in monitoring we use data from our village-level survey on the 
most recent visit to each village by the Block Development Officer (BDO) and the 
District Collector, the two officials responsible for monitoring NREGS implementa-
tion at the panchayat level. Of course these visits could have been for planning as 
well as monitoring purposes. In our Orissa sample, 62 percent of panchayats had a 
BDO visit and 24 percent had a Collector visit since the beginning of the NREGS 
in 2005. For these panchayats, we can test whether the likelihood of a visit went up 
after May of 2007. Let t be the month in which a given panchayat was last visited 
by an official.28 We suppose that the probability of the panchayat receiving a visit is 
independent (but not identical) across months, as would be the case under optimal 
monitoring with symmetric information. Let p(τ | θ, d) be the probability that a pan-
chayat in district d receives a visit at time τ. Assume that p has the logit form
(8)  p (t | θ, d) =  exp { δ d + γ1 (t ≥  t 
∗ ) + f  (t)} ___    
1 + exp { δ d + γ1(t ≥  t ∗ ) + f  (t)} .
If we had data on all official visits, then we could estimate p( ⋅ | θ, d) directly. Because 
we only observe the date of the most recent visit, we focus instead on the probability 
that the panchayat’s last visit was at time t :
(9)  f  (t | θ, d) = p (t | θ, d ) ·  ∏ 
τ =t+1
 
T
  ( 1 − p (τ | θ, d ) ) .
Similarly, the probability that a panchayat did not receive a visit since the beginning 
of the NREGS is
(10)   ∏ 
τ = t _
T
  ( 1 − p (τ | θ, d ) ) ,
where  t _ is the NREGS start date. We estimate this model via maximum likelihood 
for both BDOs and Collectors and for various specifications of p, in each case test-
ing the γ = 0. Table 8 reports the results. The estimate of γ is positive but small and 
insignificant for BDOs; for collectors it is positive and insignificant when control-
ling linearly for time and is significantly negative when controlling for a quadratic in 
time. In short, we find no evidence of an increase in monitoring intensity associated 
with the change in the daily wage.29
28 In a small number of panchayats respondents could only remember the year, and not the month, of the most 
recent visit by an official. We allow these observations to contribute to the likelihood function by simply calculat-
ing the probability that the most recent visit fell in the given year. Our results are insensitive to omitting these 
observations.
29 One natural question is how closely officials’ expectations of changes in monitoring intensity corresponded to 
actual changes. While we cannot directly measure their beliefs, we can examine changes in monitoring surrounding 
earlier wages changes, which arguably shed light on what officials might reasonably have expected following the 
May 1, 2007 reform. We estimated models analogous to those in Table 8 for two earlier reforms, a February 2006 
daily-wage increase and an April 2006 piece-rate increase. We find that the estimated impact of these reforms (not 
reported) on visit probabilities is negative in all but one specification. We read these results as suggestive that offi-
cials should, if anything, have expected a small reduction in monitoring.
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F. Interpreting magnitudes
Given the confidence intervals around some of our coefficients, their magnitudes 
should be interpreted cautiously. With that caveat in mind we provide two calcula-
tions as benchmarks. First, we compare the actual increase in theft due to the shock 
to the counterfactual effect of a temporary wage hike without golden goose effects. 
We estimate that the permanent increase in daily wages that we study raised theft by 
64 percent less than a temporary increase of the same magnitude would have, indi-
cating that golden goose effects had a substantial “dampening” effect.30 However, 
the 90 percent confidence interval around that estimate is 8–120 percent, suggesting 
that this number must be interpreted with caution. Second, we compare the mag-
nitude of golden goose effects to the effects of other anti-corruption interventions 
studied in the literature. We estimate that the dynamic effects of the wage change 
lowered daily-wage overreporting and piece-rate theft by 49 percent and 77 per-
cent, respectively.31 These are meaningful effect sizes in comparison with other esti-
mates from the literature. For example, Olken (2007) estimates that increasing the 
30 We estimate the actual increase in theft due to the shock as the sum of three components: (i) a mechanical 
component equal to the predicted quantity of daily-wage overreporting absent the shock multiplied by the change in 
the average daily wage, (ii) a behavioral response in daily-wage overreporting, which we estimate using the coeffi-
cients from column 2, panel B of Table 3, and (iii) a negative behavioral response in piece-rate theft, estimated using 
the coefficient in column 2, panel A of Table 4 (a conservative assumption given that the difference-in-differences 
estimates of the latter effect are larger). We sum these effects to obtain an estimate  Δ actual of the total effect of the 
shock on rent extraction. To construct a counterfactual estimate of the effect  Δ counter of a temporary wage hike, we 
perform a similar calculation but omit the contributions of the piece-rate regressions and the forward-looking inter-
action term in the daily-wage regressions. Putting these pieces together, we estimate   Δ counter −  Δ actual   _
 Δ counter   = 64 percent.
31 We estimate golden goose effects on daily-wage overreporting as the interaction coefficient from column 2, 
panel B of Table 3 multiplied by the average fraction of future projects that are daily wage, divided by mean 
daily-wage overreporting prior to the shock. Similarly, we estimate golden goose effects on piece-rate theft as the 
coefficient in column 2, panel A of Table 4 divided by mean piece-rate theft prior to the shock.
Table 8—ML Estimates of Changing Audit Probabilities over Time
Regressor BDO BDO Collector Collector
Shock 0.049 0.07 0.105 −1.597
(0.304) (0.322) (0.482) (0.753)**
Koraput −3.007 −2.996 −4.769 −4.854
(0.179)*** (0.187)*** (0.276)*** (0.274)***
Gajapati −4.771 −4.761 −5.742 −5.83
(0.242)*** (0.246)*** (0.39)*** (0.389)***
Rayagada −3.872 −3.862 −5.425 −5.51
(0.168)*** (0.174)*** (0.284)*** (0.283)***
Day 0.082 0.082 0.048 0.147
(0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.024)* (0.038)***
Day2 0 0.007
(0.001) (0.002)***
Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of a visit by gov-
ernment officials—Block Development Officers (BDO) and District Collectors—to the pan-
chayat. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “t” and “t 2” are time 
trends. Koraput, Rayagada, and Gajapati are indicators for the three study districts in Orissa. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 probability of audit from 4 percent to 100 percent reduced corruption on Indonesian 
road projects by 30 percent; Ferraz and Finan (2011) estimate that Brazilian mayors 
who are eligible for reelection misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than those 
who are not.
For policy purposes it would be informative to conduct a complete calibration 
of our model. Unfortunately this is infeasible without richer data on all the sources 
of rent which a corrupt official would lose if suspended or fired, and the value of 
their outside options. We can, however, provide some sense of whether NREGS 
rents are a significant source of income relative to licit compensation. We estimate 
total NREGS rents per panchayat (or block) per month by calculating the differ-
ence between actual and reported payments in our sample multiplied by the inverse 
of the sampling probability, and compare these to sarpanch honorariums and BDO 
salaries as per the Government of Orissa’s payscales (based on sixth Central Pay 
Commission). The contrasts are stark. The estimated rate of rent extraction per pan-
chayat is roughly 150 times the rate at which sarpanchs are compensated, and the 
rate per block is 1,100 times the rate at which Block Development Officers are 
compensated. These figures clearly suggest that optimal contracts should take the 
influence of illicit rents into account.
V. Conclusion
Dismissal, suspension, and transfer are standard tools for disciplining corrupt 
agents. We show that these incentives generate a “golden goose” effect: as steady-
state opportunities to extract rent increase the value of continuing in office increases 
and this induces agents to act more cautiously. This dynamic mechanism tends to 
dampen, and may reverse, the predictions of static models.
We test for golden goose effects using panel data on corruption in India’s National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, exploiting an exogenous increase in program 
wages to construct tests. We find two forms of evidence consistent with our theory: 
higher daily wages lead to lower theft from piece-rate projects, and differentially 
lower theft in areas with a higher proportion of daily-wage projects upcoming. Rough 
calculations based on the point estimates imply that these effects reduced the increase 
in corruption generated by the wage change by approximately 64 percent. Future 
work might focus on the longer-term implications of this effect for rent extraction.
Appendix
A. Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
The official’s problem during daily-wage periods is
    max   n  [ ( _ w −  w t ) n t + (  n −  n t )  _ w + β  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) )  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) ] .
The posited attributes of π ensure that this problem has an interior solution satisfy-
ing  
_ w = β  π   n (  n,  n t ) _ V ( _ w , ϕ). Differentiating with respect to  _ w yields
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   ∂  n _ ∂  _ w  =  
1 − β π   n  ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w    _β π   n  n  _ V ( _ w , ϕ)  .
Substitution in the first-order condition yields
   ∂  n _ ∂  _ w  =  
1 −   _ w  _  _ V  ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w  
 _ β  π   n  n  _ V ( _ w , ϕ)  ,
from which (and  π   n  n > 0) the result is apparent.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The official’s problem during piece-rate periods is
   max   q  [ ( _ r −  r t )  q t + (  q −  q t )  _ r + β  ( 1 − μ (  q,  q t ) )  
_ V ( _ w , ϕ) ] .
The posited attributes of μ ensure that this problem has an interior solution satisfy-
ing the Kuhn-Tucker condition  
_ r = β μ   q(  q,  q t ) _ V ( _ w , ϕ). Since ( _ r ,  r t ,  q t ) are fixed we 
know that   qt  
_ r −  q t r t moves with   qt . Differentiating with respect to  _ w yields
   ∂  q _ ∂  _ w  =  
−β μ   q  ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w   _  β μ   q  q  _ V ( _ w , ϕ) .
Since  μ   q  q > 0, it is sufficient to show  ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w  > 0. By the envelope theorem
   ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w  = ϕ  
∂ V ( _ w , 1, ϕ)  _∂  _ w   + (1 − ϕ)  
∂ V( _ w , 1, ϕ) _∂  _ w   
 = ϕ  n + β  [ ϕ  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) ) + (1 − ϕ) ( 1 − μ (  q,  q t ) ) ]  ∂  
_ V  _∂  _ w  
 =  ϕ  n   ____    
1 − β  [ ϕ  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) ) + (1 − ϕ) ( 1 − μ (  q,  q t ) ) ]  > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Let θ = (ϕ,  _ w ,  _ r ) represent the full set of parameters, and Θ the parameter space, 
which is closed and bounded by assumption. After some algebra,
   ∂ _ ∂ ϕ  [ ∂   n _∂  _ w   ] = A (θ) + B (θ) z (θ)
with
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 A(θ) =  −  
_ w  n  ___  (β  π   n  n  _ V ) ( ϕ  y o (1) + (1 − ϕ)  y o (0) )  
 B(θ) =   
_ w ϕ  n
  _ _   (β π   n  n  _ V ) ( ϕ  y o (1) + (1 − ϕ) y o (0) ) 2  
 +  
 ( 1 −   _ w  _  _ V ∂  _ V  _∂  _ w  ) ( β  π   n  n  n   π   n  _  _ V π   n  n  + β  π   n  n ) 
   __ _    (β  π   n  n  _ V ) 2 ( 1 − β  [ ϕ  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) ) + (1 − ϕ) ( 1 − μ (  q,  q t ) ) ] )  
 z (θ) =  y o (1) −  y o (0).
All these functions are assumed smoothly continuous. Fix ϵ > 0, define Θ(ϵ) 
≡ {θ ∈ Θ : | z(θ) | < ϵ}, and
  u (ϵ) ≡  sup  
θ∈Θ(ϵ)
A (θ) +  sup  
θ∈Θ(ϵ)
B (θ) · ϵ.
Then | z(θ) | < ϵ implies  ∂ _ ∂ ϕ  [  ∂   n _ ∂  _ w ]  ≤ u(ϵ). Since Θ is closed and bounded and A(θ) < 0 
for any fixed, finite θ we must have sup θ∈Θ A(θ) < 0, and so li m ϵ→0 su p θ∈Θ(ϵ) A(θ) < 0. 
Meanwhile since Θ(ϵ) shrinks with ϵ we must have li m ϵ→0 su p θ∈Θ(ϵ) B(θ)  ·  ϵ =  0. 
Hence for ϵ sufficiently small  ∂ _ ∂ ϕ  [  ∂   n _ ∂  _ w ]  ≤  u(ϵ)  <  0. The same argument holds for 
 ∂ _ ∂ ϕ  [  ∂   q _ ∂  _ w ] with
  A(θ) =  − μ   q   n _ μ   q  q  
  B (θ) =  − μ   q ϕ  n  ___  
 μ   q  q  ( ϕ y o (1) + (1 − ϕ)  y o (0) ) 2  
 −  − μ   q ( μ   q  q
2 −  μ   q  μ   q  q  q)  _____  
 μ   q  q3  _ V 2  ( 1 − β  [ ϕ  ( 1 − π (  n,  n t ) ) + (1 − ϕ) ( 1 − μ (  q,  q t ) ) ] )  
  z (θ) =  y o (1) −  y o (0).
As before, ( _ r ,  r t ,  q t ) fixed imply that   qt  _ r −  q t  r t moves with   qt .
B. Survey results and Sample Description
We interviewed households during January and February 2008. Given the sensi-
tive nature of the survey, and the dangers inherent in surveying in a region beset 
with Maoist insurgents, conflict between mining conglomerates and the local tribal 
population, and tensions between evangelical Christian missionaries and right-wing 
Hindu activists, our surveyors were asked not to enter villages if they felt threatened 
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in any way.32 We could not perfectly predict trouble spots in advance, hence out of 
the original sample of 1,938 households, we were unable to even attempt to reach 
439. The main obstacles were an incident which caused tensions between a mining 
company and locals in Rayagada and a polite request by Maoist rebels (“Naxals”) 
not to enter certain areas of Koraput. As Table B1 shows, the differences between 
the initial sample and the analysis sample generated by this attrition are reassuringly 
small and generally insignificant. Particularly important, there is no difference in the 
rate at which we reached households that worked before or after the wage change. 
The one significant difference is the fraction of spells performed by members of a 
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, which is higher in the initial sample because 
the factors related to violence were concentrated in tribal areas. Values for the frame 
and initial sample are essentially identical by design.
Of the 1,499 households we did attempt to reach, we managed to reach or con-
firm the nonexistence/permanent migration/death of 1,408 households. In order to 
determine whether an individual/household that was included in the official records 
was actually nonexistent or dead or no longer lived in the village, we asked sur-
veyors to confirm the status with three neighbors who were willing to supply their 
names on the survey. Households who match these stringent standards are included 
in the analysis as fictitious. We exclude from the analysis 91 households whose sta-
tus we could not verify, who were temporarily away, or who declined to participate.
Of the 1,328 households in which we completed interviews, only 821 con-
firmed having a household member who worked on an NREGS project during the 
period we asked about.33 Those households that actually worked on NREGS are 
32 A number of people have been threatened, beaten, and even murdered for investigating NREGS corruption, 
including an activist killed in May 2008 in one of our sampled Panchayats. See, for example, an article in the Hindu 
describing the dangers facing NGO activists working on NREGS issues: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/05/22/
stories/2008052253871000.htm. For an account of an armed Maoist attack on a police armament depot in a 
neighboring district see http://www.thehindu.com/2008/02/17/stories/2008021757890100.htm. For an account of 
Christian-Hindu tension see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7486252.stm.
33 Since we had exact descriptions of the projects—e.g., “farm pond construction near main road X in village 
Y and Panchayat Z ”—we are confident that respondents could distinguish between NREGS projects and other 
projects.
Table B1—Characteristics of Spells in Sample Frame, Initial Sample, and Reached Sample
All spells Sampled spells Reached spells
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p-value
Age 37.60 14.93 37.37 13.60 37.55 13.28 0.33
Male 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.67
SC/ST 0.78 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 0.05
Post 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.57
Spell length 11.13 2.92 11.14 3.01 11.09 3.14 0.33
Wage spell 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.38 0.84 0.36 0.20
Daily rate 63.48 17.24 64.37 20.34 63.90 18.92 0.30
Notes: Reports summary statistics at the work-spell level using official records and for (i) the universe of spells 
sampled from (N = 111,172), (ii) the initial sample of work spells we drew (N = 7,126), and (iii) the work spells 
done by households we were ultimately able to interview (N = 4,794). The last column reports the p-value from a 
regression of the variable in question on an indicator for whether or not the observation is in our analysis sample 
(conditional on being in our initial sample), with standard errors clustered at the panchayat level.
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very similar to those that did not. In general, the sample is poor, uneducated, and 
uninformed, even when compared to averages across India or Orissa. Seventy-
seven percent of households possess Below Poverty Line cards, only 27 percent of 
household heads are “literate” (able to write their names), and almost no one has 
heard of the Right to Information Act (which entitles citizens to request copies of 
most government records).
Table B2—Sample Description
NREGA participants Nonparticipants
Variable Observations Mean SD Observations Mean SD
Demographics
 Number of HH members 812 4.94 1.88 498 4.65 2.18 
 BPL card holder 815 0.77 0.42 497 0.76 0.43 
 HH head is literate 803 0.3 0.46 501 0.23 0.42 
 HH head educated through grade 10 819 0.04 0.19 502 0.04 0.2 
Awareness
 Knows HH keeps job card 806 0.84 0.37 476 0.89 0.31 
 Number of amenities aware of 810 0.96 0.85 494 0.78 0.82 
 HH head has heard of RTI Act 821 0.02 0.13 501 0.01 0.09 
Notes: This table describes attributes of the household survey sample that was successfully interviewed in Orissa. 
The sample is split between households who confirm that they worked on an NREGA project between March 1 and 
June 30, 2007—821 households (NREGA participants)—and those that did not (507 households). “BPL” stands 
for Below the Poverty Line, a designation that entitles one to several government programs, although makes no dif-
ference for NREGA work. The definition for literacy used by the Indian government is whether one can sign her 
name (instead of placing a thumbprint). The amenities meant to be provided at the worksite in NREGA projects 
are—amongst others—water, shade, first aid, and a creche/child care. We ask respondents to name amenities with-
out prompting. “RTI” stands for the Right to Information Act, a freedom of information act passed by the Indian 
government in 2005.
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C. Additional Appendix Tables
Table C1—Numerical Example of Dependent Variable Construction
Attributed work by day
Worker Report May 1 May 2 May 3 May 4 May 5 May 6
A 3 days between May 1–6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
B 4 days from May 3–6 0 0 1 1 1 1
Totals: 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Notes: This table presents numerical examples of how our dependent variables were aggregated up to the pan-
chayat-day level from official and survey reports of work done. The rows show two typical reports of work done 
within a panchayat; the columns show how we attributed the number of days reported as worked across the period 
during which they were worked, and summed them up for each panchayat-day record.
Table C2—Wage Shock Effects on Daily-Wage Reports, Quadratic Time Trends
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock 0.88 0.88 1.04 1.23 1.23 1.40
(0.78) (0.79) (0.98) (0.79) (0.80) (0.94)
Shock × AlwaysDW −1.75* −1.75* −1.73*
(1.01) (0.99) (0.99)
AlwaysDW 2.14** 2.28*** 2.27***
(0.84) (0.86) (0.86)
Observations 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810 12,810
 r 2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock 2.28** 2.22** 2.28* 3.01** 2.97** 2.97*
(0.94) (0.95) (1.26) (1.24) (1.24) (1.53)
Shock × FdwAll −1.83* −1.76* −1.78* −3.90*** −3.71*** −3.70***
(1.07) (1.06) (1.06) (1.40) (1.38) (1.35)
Shock × FdwSome −1.07 −1.05 −1.03 −0.17 −0.15 −0.11
(1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
Shock × BdwAll 2.17 2.07 2.10
(1.51) (1.47) (1.44)
Shock × BdwSome −2.01** −2.04** −2.01**
(0.95) (0.98) (0.94)
Observations 11,386 11,386 11,386 10,651 10,651 10,651
 r 2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14
Time controls Day2 Day2 Shock×Day2 Day2 Day2 Shock×Day2
District FEs N Y Y N Y Y
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of days of 
daily-wage work officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and 6, 
it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysDW” is a panchayat that had a daily-wage project 
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the pan-
chayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. 
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but 
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include con-
trols for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a third-
order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat 
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day 
are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C3—Wage Shock Effects on Piece-Rate Reports, Quadratic Time Trends
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock −78.02* −77.69* −107.05* −81.48** −81.52** −111.41**
(40.02) (40.25) (59.55) (40.38) (40.67) (56.18)
Shock × AlwaysPr 15.56 16.98 18.41
(50.35) (49.60) (48.96)
AlwaysPr −35.38 −33.32 −34.25
(33.82) (34.78) (34.62)
Observations 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076 7,076
 r 2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock −37.46 −39.62 −83.01 −63.16 −61.93 −100.15
(67.85) (66.82) (73.64) (73.25) (72.47) (84.32)
Shock × FdwAll −27.71 −22.54 −20.67 −50.13 −37.42 −36.27
(70.79) (68.47) (67.62) (96.55) (92.82) (91.82)
Shock × FdwSome −74.57 −73.74 −69.65 −75.65 −74.54 −69.08
(72.20) (69.9) (69.30) (96.15) (94.64) (93.13)
Shock × BdwAll 114.07 111.48 115.15
(84.33) (84.62) (84.54)
Shock × BdwSome 14.69 8.19 4.83
(90.81) (90.69) (89.31)
Observations 6,543 6,543 6,543 6,209 6,209 6,209
 r 2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
Time controls Day2 Day2 Shock×Day2 Day2 Day2 Shock×Day2
District FEs N Y Y N Y Y
Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid on 
piece-rate projects officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and 
6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysPr” is a panchayat that had a piece rate project 
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the pan-
chayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. 
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but 
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include con-
trols for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a third-
order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat 
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day 
are presented in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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